A Quality of Government Peace? Bringing the State Back Into the Study of Inter-State Armed Conflict by Råby, Nils & Teorell, Jan
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
=
=
=
=
=
A Quality of Government Peace? 
Bringing the State Back Into the Study of Inter-State 
Armed Conflict 
 
 
Nils Råby 
Jan Teorell 
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
QoG WORKING PAPER SERIES 2010:20=
=
THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
Box 711 
SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG 
 
September 2010 
 
 
ISSN 1653-8919 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2010 by Nils Råby and Jan Teorell. All rights reserved. Prepared for delivery at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Washington DC, September 2−5, 2010. 
A Quality of Government Peace? 
Bringing the State Back Into the  
Study of Inter-State Armed Conflict 
Nils Råby 
Jan Teorell 
QoG Working Paper Series 2010:20 
September 2010 
ISSN 1653-8919 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Domestically, democracy or democratization has not proved as successful in bringing 
about preferred economic and social consequences as has “good governance” and 
quality of government. Within the field of international relations, by contrast, one of 
the strongest empirical regularities still remains that democracies do not wage war 
against each other. In this paper we show however that the impact of quality of 
government, most notably corruption, on the risk of interstate conflict by large 
amounts trumps the influence of democracy. These results draw on dyadic Militarized 
Interstate Disputes data in 1984-2000, and hold even under control for the capitalist 
peace, incomplete democratization, realist claims and geographic constraints. We 
argue that the causal mechanism underlying this finding is that quality of government 
reduces information asymmetry among potentially warring parties, improves their 
ability to communicate resolve, and to credibly commit to keeping to their promises. 
 
 
Nils Råby 
Department of Political Science 
Lund University 
nils_raby@hotmail.com   
 
 
 
 
Jan Teorell 
The Quality of Government Institute 
Department of Political Science 
Lund University 
jan.teorell@svet.lu.se   
  3
Introduction 
That democracies do not wage wars against each other is undoubtedly one of the most widely 
accepted claims within the study of international relations. Probably less well known is the 
fact that, when seen from the perspective of the broader literature on domestic consequences 
of democracy, the democratic peace effect is something of an exception. Despite countless of 
studies, there are for example no robust evidence linking democracy to economic growth or 
even to poverty reduction or human development more generally (for an overview, see 
Rothstein and Teorell 2008). True, democracy usually comes out as a strong predictor of 
human rights, but democracy should arguably be defined at least partly in terms of key 
personal integrity rights, so this finding is not all that surprising. 
 
This contrasts sharply with the more robust findings linking “good governance” and high-
quality government institutions — other than democracy — to preferred social, economic and 
political outcomes. To begin with, economists have started to view dysfunctional government 
institutions as the most serious obstacle to economic development across the globe (e.g., Hall 
and Jones 1999; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine 2003; 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). Unlike democracy, the quality of government (QoG) 
factor has also been argued to have substantial effects on a number of important non-
economic phenomena, both at the individual level — such as subjective happiness (Frey and 
Stutzer 2000; Helliwell 2003; Tavits 2007; Helliwell and Huang 2008), citizen support for 
government (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Chang and Chu 2006), and interpersonal trust 
(Rothstein and Uslaner 2007; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Rothstein and Eek 2009) — and at 
the societal level — such as improved public health and environmental sustainability 
(Holmberg et al. 2009), and state legitimacy (Gilley 2006). 
 
In this paper we attempt to bring the study of interstate conflict more in line with this more 
general literature. More specifically, drawing on dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes data in 
1985-2000, we show that the impact of quality of government on the risk of interstate conflict 
by large amounts trumps the influence of democracy. We thus find stronger evidence in 
favour of a quality of government as compared to a democratic peace. These results hold even 
under control for incomplete democratization, realist claims and geographic constraints. We 
also find that the relationship between quality of government and peace is robust to controls 
for the “capitalist peace” (Gartzke 2007), an alternative account that in recent years has been 
  4
put forward as a challenge to democratic peace theory. Theoretically, we argue that the causal 
mechanism underlying this finding is that quality of government reduces information 
asymmetry among potentially warring parties, improves their ability to communicate resolve, 
and to credibly commit to keep to their promises. By taking into account broader features of 
the state as a complex organization, we conceive of the quality of government peace as an 
argument for brining “the state back in” to the study of armed conflict and international 
relations more generally. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. We first overview the key controversies within the 
democratic peace literature, followed by our main theoretical argument as to why quality of 
government should matter for peace. A section on data and research design is then followed 
by the empirical findings. We conclude with some reflections on the broader implications of 
our findings. 
The Democratic Peace and Its Critics 
The philosophical roots of the democratic peace theory can be traced back to the essay 
“Perpetual peace”, written by Emanuel Kant in the late 18th century. Kant’s basic argument is 
that the public in democracies are pacifistic, while leaders in autocracies are warlike. Since 
citizens are the ones doing the fighting, they are likely to be opposed to decisions for war. 
Democratic leaders who want to remain in power must thus obey the will of the people and 
stay out of war engagement. Although many of the assumptions made by Kant have been 
criticized, the “Perpetual peace” remains an important source of inspiration for contemporary 
advocates of the democratic peace proposition (Ray 1995: 1-3). 
 
The modern versions of the democratic peace theory focus on the relations between 
democracies (Ray 1995: 21-30). By conducting large-N analysis of data pertaining to pairs of 
states (dyads), researchers have been able to show that there is a correlation between the 
probability of interstate war and the regime type of the dyads. Simply put, the more 
democratic the states in a dyad are, the greater is the likelihood of peace (Maoz & Abdolali 
1989; Bremer 1992; Oneal & Russett 1999; Russett & Oneal 2001).  
 
Although these statistical findings to some extent depend on the methodological position of 
the researcher, such as definitions of war and democracy and interpretation of statistical 
significance (Elman 1997a: 20-24), the generalization that democracies do not wage war 
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against each other is by and large quite uncontested in the research community (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 1999: 791, Kinsella 2005, Paris 2004:42) and it has even been proposed as an 
empirical law (Levy 1988). 
 
How then could the democratic peace be explained? There are two major theoretical accounts 
within the literature: the structural, or institutional, and the cultural, or normative, 
explanation. According to the latter, democracies are like-minded and have a shared view on 
economic and political polices and a common political culture. Disputes between democracies 
do not escalate to war because leaders expect that their shared political ideology will lead 
them to find a mutual and peaceful resolution of the conflict (Elman 1997a: 10-11). The 
structural explanation draws on the ideas introduced by Kant, emphasizing the political 
constraints on democratic leaders which make it more difficult for them to engage in war 
(Ray 1995: 30). Since democratic leaders need the support of the voting public before they go 
to war, they will be reluctant and slow to fight. They will count on that other democracies 
function in the same way and thereby expect an opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement 
before the conflict escalates to war (Elman 1997a: 13). 
 
In a game theoretical model, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) offer an ambitious institutional 
explanation of the democratic peace. They argue that since democratic leaders can not afford 
any policy failures, they make a greater effort to succeed in disputes, spending more resources 
on wars they are certain to win and avoiding those they risk to lose. This implies that two 
democracies in a conflict will try to avoid war, both of them knowing that such a development 
would be very costly. 
 
Both the cultural and the structural explanations of the democratic peace have been criticized. 
The normative argument that liberal states only fight wars for liberal purposes faces 
difficulties in explaining the historical record of democracies engaged in war for other than 
humanitarian or self-defense purposes, as “liberal states have consistently violated liberal 
norms when deciding to go to war” (Rosato 2003: 588-590). It is also possible that a state, 
itself claiming to be a democracy, will not be perceived as a democracy by other states. This 
is particularly relevant in the case of recently transformed democracies (Rosato 2003: 586). 
 
Critics of the structural explanation claim that the assumption of a pacifying public is 
inaccurate since there are many examples where pressure from the public promoted, rather 
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than constrained, leaders to go to war (Elman 1997a: 27). Additionally, Rosato (2003: 593-
594) has questioned the assumption that democratic leaders are more accountable than leaders 
in autocracies. He claims that the cost from fighting losing or costly wars is just as large for 
autocratic leaders as it is for their democratic counterparts. Although the significance of 
Rosato’s findings have been questioned (Kinsella 2005), they deserve consideration as 
autocratic leaders might face far worse treatment than their democratic counterparts — should 
their policies fail — and thus have even larger incentives to succeed in disputes. 
 
In addition to the contested general relationship between democracy and conflict, another 
concern about the peacefulness of democracies has been raised. Mansfield & Snyder (2005) 
agree that the democratic peace holds strong for consolidated democracies but argue that 
fledgling democracies, undergoing the process of democratization, are highly belligerent and 
even more war prone than autocracies. They study the relationship between democratization 
and conflict, also in a dyadic setting, and find that incomplete democratization, where 
democracy has not yet been consolidated, increases the risk of conflict (Mansfield & Snyder 
2002). This implies that joint democracy might not always be a sufficient condition for peace, 
as some democracies obviously are more war prone than others (Elman 1997b: 488). The 
transition problem is also illustrated in the curvilinear relationship between democracy and 
the probability of civil war (Herge et al. 2001). 
 
There is also the general neorealist critic that democratic norms or institutions matter little 
when national interests are at stake. According to this view, adverse distribution of military 
power and common security interests often account for why democracies have avoided war in 
the past (Elman 1997a: 25). Arguing along these lines, a number of alternative interpretations 
of the democratic peace have been put forward. Rosato (2003) introduces the “imperial 
peace” and claims that the democratic peace is “a post-World war II phenomenon restricted to 
the Americas and Western Europe”, and should be ascribed to the US commitment to ensure 
peace in these regions. Faber & Gowa (1997) argue that violent disputes between democracies 
are only rare events during the Cold War and that the dispute patterns are explained by 
common interests rather than common polities. Gartzke (1998, 2000) offers yet another 
solution and claims that the democratic peace is really not caused by the constraining power 
of democratic political institutions or culture, but rather by the lack of conflict between 
democracies due to affinity.  
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While these, somewhat similar, explanations rightfully question the universality of the 
democratic peace theory, it is possible to argue that they do not really contradict its 
foundations. The “lack of conflict” and “common interests” between democracies might very 
well be a result of their common polities. Additionally, the growing number of democratic 
states in the world further questions the assumption that national interests solely account for 
the peacefulness of democracies.  
 
A more profound challenge to the democratic peace that has emerged in recent years claims 
that the capitalist economic structure, rather than democratic institutions, accounts for 
pacifism. Thus, Gartzke (2007) argues, and find empirical evidence in favor of, a pacifying 
effect of financial and monetary integration generally, and economic development among 
contiguous dyads. These effects cancel out the democratic peace during the cold-war period, 
“suggesting that capitalism, and not democracy, leads to peace” (Gartzke 2007: 180). A 
slightly different view is presented by Patrick McDonald (2009, 2010), who argues that large 
quantities of public property — a structural feature of the economy antithetical to capitalism 
— increases the risk of armed conflict by creating a commitment problem between states. 
Whereas the controversy over the capitalist peace is still in its infancy,1 both this alternative 
view and the traditional democratic peace theory omit another critical feature of the state, 
namely the structure and quality of the state bureaucracy.  
 
The Quality of Government Peace 
Whereas democracy relates to the input side of the political system, and capitalism is a feature 
of the surrounding economic system, the key attribute of quality of government (henceforth 
QoG) is that it relates to the output side of politics, where decisions are prepared and 
implemented. As opposed to both democratic and capitalist peace theories, which have 
attempted to explain interstate conflict with reference to how access to government authority 
is regulated, the QoG peace theory we advance thus relates to how government authority in a 
country is being exercised. Following Rothstein and Teorell (2008), we define QoG as 
impartiality in the exercise of government authority, implying that government officials 
should act in accordance with the beforehand stipulated law or policy and take no other 
                                                     
1 The interested reader is referred to a recent theme issue in International Interactions (Schneider & Gleditsch 
2010). 
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considerations into account. This definition (negatively understood) most importantly rules 
out systematic corruption, patrimonialism, nepotism, and clientelism among state officials. 
 
States low in QoG are sometimes referred to as “failing” or “weak” states, and it is widely 
recognized that weak or failing states cause many of the most difficult problems facing the 
world today. Fukuyama (2004: 92-93) claims that these states “commit human rights abuses, 
provoke humanitarian disasters, drive massive waves of immigration, and attack their 
neighbors”. Tilly (2007: 176) adds that “weak states have a destructive propensity to civil 
war”, which is also confirmed statistically, as the probability of civil war increases as a state 
gets weaker (Öberg & Melander 2005). While this knowledge strengthens the notion that 
QoG might reduce the risk of interstate disputes, it does not address the causal mechanism 
between QoG and peace. How then, does QoG affect the risk of interstate conflict? 
 
In order to answer this, it is first necessary to examine the foundations of conflict resolution. 
Fearon (1995), in his seminal work on this matter, argues that all wars are ineffective ex post 
and thus that there is always a negotiated solution available ex ante which is preferable to 
both parties. The reasons why this solution is not always reached are twofold: (a) that the 
parties have asymmetric information about their relative military capability and their 
opponent’s willingness to fight, combined with incentives for leaders to misinterpret this 
information, or (b) that state cannot credibly commit not to renege on the supposedly efficient 
bargained outcome, which thus cannot be reached. 
 
So, in what ways does QoG reduce the information asymmetry between states, improve their 
ability to communicate resolve, and credibly commit to their promises? Most importantly, 
QoG increases predictability in government behavior. It ensures that rule of law will prevail 
and that individuals will be treated equally. A strong state hinders civil conflict and reduces 
the risk that civil unrest will incite international disputes. This means that citizens as well as 
the international community better can anticipate the actions of the state. An illustrative 
example of how failed domestic policies can create international crises is the mistrust directed 
towards weak states failing to curb terrorism (Fukuyama 2004: 93). QoG also increases the 
credibility of the state as an actor in the international community. A strong state with solid 
and impartial institutions is more trustworthy and less likely as an adversary. If other states 
can rely on that their negotiating partner will remain stable and not fall apart any time soon, 
relations between the countries will be strengthened. On the other hand, in corrupt and 
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malfunctioning states, where oligarchs and clans battle for power, it might be hard to know 
who really governs (Johnston 2005: 152-153). This would make it difficult to anticipate the 
actions of the state, which in turn could make other states suspicious or even contentious. 
 
The essence of this reasoning is that QoG reduces uncertainty and increases trust among 
states, which equals reduced information asymmetry and improved communication channels. 
This reduces the risk of conflict as peaceful international relations are easier to achieve with a 
stable, predictable, and credible state that other nations can rely upon. This argument should 
in particular pertain to the dyadic level. Since a conflict can result from the actions of a single 
state, it is likely that the beneficial effects of QoG are strongest when both states in a dyad are 
governed impartially.  
 
Admittedly, our reliance on Fearon’s (1995) private information and credible commitment 
mechanisms is by no means novel. On the contrary, both mechanisms have in one way or 
another been used before to explain either the democratic or the capitalist peace. So why 
would the QoG peace argument fit these mechanisms better? Although this claim naturally 
requires more precise empirical testing in the future, our main argument is that the actors 
implied by the QoG peace theory more closely resembles the key decision makers involved 
when states make the choices of whether to wage wars against each other. Democratic peace 
theory, to the extent it at all points to a set of actors, has been mainly preoccupied by trying to 
understand the inner workings of the top political leadership, be they democratically elected 
government executives or dictators. But the administrative apparatus engaged in planning and 
executing modern warfare of course extends far beyond these top echelons of the political 
system. Other key players involve, most importantly, the governing corpus of the armed 
forces and its intelligence service, but also other parts of the bureaucracy involved in 
extracting resources or in maintaining domestic order necessary for the war machinery. The 
preoccupation with the question of whether the top political leadership has been 
democratically elected or not has led to a neglect of these other and far more numerous key 
actors within the state decision-making machinery.  
 
Our QoG peace theory, by contrast, directly takes into account the behavior of all facets of the 
political system, including the actors within governmental bodies responsible for preparing 
and implementing key political decisions. This is also of critical importance when considering 
the relational character of the international system, that is, that most decisions of this 
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magnitude are based on expectations among the contending parties. When assessing the 
strength of one’s opponents’ signal of resolve, or the credibility of their commitment not to 
renege on a struck bargain, it seems more probable that larger parts of their administrative 
apparatus is taken into consideration, not simply the expected behavior of the head of their 
executive.2 At a more general level, our claim is thus an argument for “bringing the state back 
in” to the study of international relations. 
Data and Research Design 
To sum up, we expect that, all else being equal, the higher the QoG of the weaker state in a 
dyad, the lower the risk of interstate conflict. We test this assertion through logistic regression 
analysis performed on dyad year observations from two replication datasets: that of Sobek et 
al. (2006),3 covering the time period from 1984-2000, and that of Gartzke (2007),4 restricted 
to the time period 1984-1992. In both tests, we use as dependent variable the Correlates of 
War MID3 data set data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) (Ghosn et al. 2004). This 
data records all instances of when one state threatened to use force, made a demonstration of 
force, or actually used force against another state. Each year that the two states in a dyad were 
involved in a dispute with each other is coded as an outbreak of conflict if there was no 
conflict coded in the previous years. There are 203 outbreaks of conflict recorded in the 
sample covering the longer time period (1984-2000), and 162 outbreaks in the more restricted 
sample (1984-1992). 
 
Our gauge of the key concept we wish to add to the study of international armed conflict, 
quality of government, is from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which is a 
product of the Political Risk Services Group (www.prsgroup.org). This data has been 
collected annually since 1984 and includes roughly 140 countries at best. The main reason 
why we choose to use the ICRG data, rather than, say, the World Bank’s development 
indicators, is that the former spans over a considerably longer time period, being more or less 
unique among QoG indicators in extending back to the cold war era. Three of the ICRG 
indicators are of particular interest to us since they are based on expert perceptions of risks to 
                                                     
2 A similar argument holds when comparing the QoG peace with capitalist peace. With rare exceptions, both 
Gartzke (2007) and McDonald (2010) merely refer to “states”, in the aggregate, as the relevant actors involved 
in decisions on war making. 
3 Their data can be found at: http://www.davidsobek.com/services.html. The original data set contained 317 
duplicates which have been removed in our analysis. 
4 Available at: http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/htmlpages/data.html. 
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international business and financial institutions stemming from (a) corruption (e.g., special 
payments, bribes, excessive patronage, and nepotism), (b) law and order (e.g., weak and 
partial legal systems, low popular observance of the law), and (c) bureaucracy quality (lack of 
autonomous and competent bureaucrats). The ICRG indicators have a distinguished history in 
the field of cross-national measurement of QoG going back to at least Knack and Keefer 
(1995). We use both the average of all three and the individual indicators, restricted to range 
from 0 (low) to 1 (high quality). Drawing on the weakest-link methodology applied in the 
democratic peace literature (Oneal & Russett 1999; Russett & Oneal 2001), we let the state 
with the lowest ICRG score in the dyad represent the joint governmental quality of the dyad, 
while controlling for the higher score of the two. 
 
Following the conventional strategy within the democratic peace theory, we use the Polity IV 
data to measure the level democracy within states. As with QoG, the weakest-link 
methodology is applied and the variable Democracy (Low) thus equals the lower, Democracy 
(High) the higher, of the two democracy scores in each dyad and year. To control for 
Mansfield and Snyder’s (2002) argument that incomplete democratization spurs the risk of 
conflict between states, we also replicate their measure of incomplete democratization and 
add it to the analysis. However, while they used the Polity III data, we use the more recent 
Polity IV version. Since this data was not included in the data set of Sobek et al. (2006), we 
add the Polity IV scores from the Quality of Government Institute data set (Teorell et al. 
2010). We then recode the revised combined polity score into regime type, where scores from 
–10 to –7 become autocracies, scores from –6 to +6 anocracies, and scores from 7 to 10 
democracies. The regime type for each state in the sample is coded in year t–1 and again in 
year t–6. A state is considered to be experiencing an incomplete democratization if it has 
moved from autocracy to anocracy during this five-year interval. The five year time period is 
of course arbitrary but in accordance with previous research.5 
 
Apart from these key political variables, we add control variables using the exact same 
specifications as in the models we are replicating, largely designed to respond to realist 
challenges and to account for the geographical limitations of international relations. In the 
case of Sobek et al. (2006) this implies controls for the capability ratio, political or military 
alliances, dissimilar civilizations, preference similarity, geographical contiguity and political 
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relevance of the dyad. Following Gartzke (2007), we control for trade dependence and 
financial openness as proxies for market integration, for GDP per capita and the interaction of 
contiguity and GDP per capita to account for the capitalist effect of development, and (as in 
Sobek et al. 2006) for preference similarity to measure state affinity. We also follow Gartzke 
(2007) in controlling for contiguity, distance between national capitals, major power status, 
alliances and the capability ratio. 
 
All independent variables are lagged one year. We take time dependence into account by 
controlling for three cubic splines (and in the Sobek et al. replication the number of peace 
years), together with robust standard errors clustered on dyads to purge the variance estimates 
from any additional cross-sectional dependence. 
Results 
We start in Table 1, based on the Sobek et al. (2006) data, by reproducing the standard 
finding in the democratic peace literature. In model 1, without any control for QoG, the level 
democracy in the least democratic state of the dyad is negatively related to the outbreak of 
militarized disputes. While this effect is reduced once the ICRG index of QoG is introduced 
in model 2, it remains statistically significant. However, the magnitude differs substantially 
between the effects of these two political variables. Since the democracy measure from Polity 
have here been rescaled to range from 0 to 1, the coefficients for the two variables can be 
compared directly. In logit terms, the negative and clearly significant QoG effect is about 
twice as large as the democracy effect. The relative risk of war outbreak when the democracy 
low score goes from its lowest (0) to its highest (1) decreases by 52 percent, as compared to a 
move of the low QoG score by the same amount, which implies a reduction of the relative risk 
by 78 percent. In sum, the pacifying effect of QoG, on this sample of militarized interstate 
disputes in the world between 1984 and 2000, clearly trumps the democratic peace effect. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
What dimensions of QoG account for this result? In model 3, we tackle this question by 
substituting the ICRG index by its three component indicators, bureaucracy quality, 
corruption, and law and order. As the results clearly demonstrate, the most important factor in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
5 Consult Mansfield and Snyder (2002) for a longer motivation of the proper length of the time period. 
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the QoG assemblage appears to be corruption. The substantive impact of corruption even 
trumps that of the composite ICRG index, a results that also holds in model 4, where the 
corruption indicator is introduced individually. Since corruption is probably the most well-
known and extensively theorized topic within the literature on quality of government, this 
finding is reassuring. Corruption, commonly defined as the abuse of public office for private 
gain, is clearly at contrast with impartial government. It makes perfect sense from the 
perspective of our theoretical argument that corruption creates information asymmetries, 
makes it harder to communicate resolve, and to credibly commit to uphold promises. 
 
We turn next in Table 2, based on the part Gartzke’s (2007) data that overlaps with the ICRG 
indicator (that is, from 1984 to 1992), to a test of whether the QoG factor holds water when 
controlling for the so called “capitalist peace”. In model 1, we simply replicate the findings 
from Table 2, albeit on a different sample and in the presence of slightly different controls, 
that both QoG and democracy negatively impacts on the probability of conflict (here the 
democracy variable has not been rescaled, and hence cannot be as easily compared to the 
QoG factor). Following Gartzke’s (2007) own approach to testing the democratic peace 
theory, we then introduce the controls for capitalism in successive steps. In model 2, we thus 
control for the level of financial openness in the least open state of the dyad, in model 3 for 
GDP per capita and the GDP-contiguity interaction, and in model 4 for preference similarity. 
In line with Gartzke’s own findings, we find that these controls for capitalism reduces the 
impact of democracy, which in the end does not pass conventional test for statistical 
significance. The QoG index, by contrast, is hardly affected by controls for the capitalist 
peace. The effect in model 4 is even slightly larger tan without any controls for capitalism, 
and in probability terms still implies that an increase from lowest to highest quality of 
government in the weaker state of a dyad reduces the risk of a militarized dispute by 74 
percent. At the same time, the financial openness indicator, arguably one of the theoretically 
strongest operationalizations of the capitalist peace argument, looses statistical significance. 
In other words, whereas capitalism may explain the democratic peace, it does not challenge 
the quality of government peace.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
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Conclusions 
In this paper we have found that the impact of quality of government, most notably 
corruption, on the risk of interstate conflict by large amounts trumps the influence of 
democracy. These results draw on dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes data in 1984-2000, 
and hold even under control for the capitalist peace, incomplete democratization, realist 
claims and geographic constraints. We have argued that the causal mechanism underlying this 
finding is that quality of government reduces information asymmetry among potentially 
warring parties, improves their ability to communicate resolve, and to credibly commit to 
keeping to their promises. Our key expectation is thus confirmed. But what are the 
implications of this result? 
 
Since the covered time period is fairly limited, one should generally be cautious of drawing to 
far-reaching conclusions. That being said, the results of the analysis clearly illustrate an 
interesting difference in the pacifying effects of democracy and QoG. These observations 
relate to the general debate on what policies developing countries should adhere to. It seems 
as if the broad recommendation that governmental reform should be prioritized applies also 
with respect to the international security dimension. It is however not so clear that the reform 
dimension that should be most prioritized regards the institutions regulating access to 
government power, such as democracy. More important for international security would be to 
reform institutions regulating how power is being exercised, that is, to strengthen “good 
governance” and quality of government. 
 
Evident as this might sound, it is however far from certain that the international community 
possess the critical know-how on how to successfully implement governance reforms. 
Although we might know that improved governance theoretically have beneficial effects, we 
still know little of how this is supposed to happen. And even if we do have the knowledge, it 
is far from certain it is transferable to recipient states in need of reform (Fukuyama 2004). It is 
an understatement to say that these problems need to receive a lot of attention in the years to 
come. 
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Table 1. Democracy, Quality of Government, and Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Democracy (Low) –.9313*** –.7443** –.7271** –.6506** 
 (.3084) (.3121) (.3072) (.3046) 
Democracy (High) .7853** .5900* .5592 .8060** 
 (.3145) (.3329) (.3462) (.3326) 
Quality of Government (Low)  –1.5100***   
  (.4643)   
Quality of Government (High)  1.3229**   
  (.5889)   
Bureaucracy Quality (Low)   .6142  
   (.4755)  
Bureaucracy Quality (High)   1.1177*  
   (.5737)  
Corruption (Low)   –2.8086*** –2.2677*** 
   (.6933) (.5268) 
Corruption (High)   –.0381 .6708 
   (.5838) (.5006) 
Law and Order (Low)   .0309  
   (.4924)  
Law and Order (High)   .2527  
   (.5464)  
Incomplete Democratic Transition .7756*** .7882*** .7991*** .7699*** 
 (.1777) (.1799) (.1820) (.1788) 
Capability Ratio –.5568** –.5755** –.6820** –.5928** 
 (.2812) (.2890) (.2798) (.2905) 
Allies .2302 .1610 .3025 .1803 
 (.2468) (.2512) (.2532) (.2478) 
Dissimilar Civilizations .0709 –.0306 –.0831 –.0381 
 (.2144) (.2271) (.2241) (.2245) 
Preference Similarity .7462 .9199 .6037 .7761 
 (.5504) (.5644) (.5432) (.5595) 
Contiguity .3395 .4485 .4918* .2607 
 (.2512) (.2938) (.2885) (.2861) 
Political Relevance 1.7721*** 1.7178*** 1.6474*** 1.8338*** 
 (.2470) (.2515) (.2545) (.2500) 
Constant –4.4826*** –4.7792*** –4.1830*** –4.0600*** 
 (.5825) (.6252) (.6472) (.5940) 
Log Likelihood –973.457 –968.081 –956.107 –961.885 
Wald Chi-Squared 1280.22 1311.67 1361.13 1275.26 
Pseudo R-Squared .311 .315 .324 .320 
* significant at the .10-level, ** significant at the .05-level, *** significant at the .01-level.  
No. of dyad year observations: 79 038 No. of dyads: 8 670 Mean no. of years per dyad: 9.11 
 
Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on dyads, within 
parentheses. All models also include controls for the number of peace years and three cubic splines. All 
independent variables have been lagged one year. 
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Table 2. Capitalism, Quality of Government, and Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Democracy (Low) –.0417** –.0366* –.0361* –.0259 
 (.0199) (.0202) (.0197) (.0198) 
Democracy (High) .0057 .0064 .0082 –.0052 
 (.0180) (.0179) (.0175) (.0180) 
Quality of Government (Low) –1.2705** –1.2791** –1.6535*** –1.3423** 
 (.5516) (.5582) (.5942) (.6220) 
Quality of Government (High) .5953 .9049 .7048 –.0422 
 (.7405) (.7757) (.7673) (.8219) 
Trade Dep. (Low) 1.1128 9.9418 14.1989 18.8164* 
 (13.1118) (11.5909) (11.2655) (1.1595) 
Fin. Open. (Low)  –.1323* –.1594** –.1294 
  (.0781) (.0812) (.0806) 
GDPPC (Low)   .0002*** .0001*** 
   (.0000) (.0000) 
GDPPC × Contig.   –.0002*** –.0002*** 
   (.0001) (.0001) 
Preference Similarity    –.6483** 
    (.2658) 
Contiguity 1.4605*** 1.5193*** 1.9617*** 2.1523*** 
 (.3111) (.3273) (.3744) (.3618) 
Distance –.3720*** –.3609*** –.3557*** –.2721** 
 (.1251) (.1227) (.1216) (.1289) 
Major Power 1.4154*** 1.3893*** 1.3995*** 1.1689*** 
 (.3045) (.2985) (.2942) (.3081) 
Alliance –.4549* –.3354 –.3265 –.3012 
 (.2637) (.2709) (.2729) (.2748) 
Capability Ratio .1058 .1288* .1328* .1147 
 (.0774) (.0773) (.0785) (.0779) 
Constant –.3678 –.4497 –.6689 –.4769 
 (1.1697) (1.1844) (1.1541) (1.1621) 
Log Likelihood –560.644 –558.220 –554.595 –550.772 
Wald Chi-Squared 734.85 724.99 723.91 707.49 
Pseudo R-Squared .472 .474 .478 .481 
* significant at the .10-level, ** significant at the .05-level, *** significant at the .01-level.  
No. of dyad year observations: 41 968 No. of dyads: 6 023 Mean no. of years per dyad: 6.97 
 
Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on dyads, within 
parentheses. All models also include controls for three cubic splines. All independent variables have been lagged 
one year. 
